IRDAI finally targets the Real problem in insurance – Commission (& Mis-Selling)

The IRDAI consultation paper, Recalibrating Economics of Insurance Distribution (September 2026), has sent serious shockwaves through the banking and agent community. It proposes curbs on mis-selling and a reset of distribution commissions. To be fair, everyone knows how the commission structure in insurance led to mis-selling. This has been going on for decades. IRDAI’s own data shows the problem. Distributor remuneration has been growing 4-5 times faster than the insurance business it is paid on.

But the new radical paper by the regulator does propose an overhaul which was long overdue. The response from those affected is obvious, and lobbying has already begun, from what little I understand.

But what is heartening is that IRDAI, for once, is acting like a customer-friendly regulator, not just a well-wisher of the insurance industry. I seriously hope IRDAI does not back off this time. If even half the proposals survive and become law, it will be a great achievement and a win for the consumers.

Here are a few thoughts on the proposal and this attempt to reform the sector.

  • One of the biggest reasons many Indians didn’t buy insurance or stayed underinsured is not just that insurance is expensive. It isn’t cheap for many. But the bigger issue has been that a large part of the first-year premium (in some cases 60-70%) never went into the risk pool. It went to high 1st year commissions for agents and banks.
  • This front-loaded structure made the business simple for the agent. Sell a new policy, collect a high first-year commission from the insurer, and then look for the next customer. Or sell yet another policy to an existing customer. IRDAI’s data shows that persistency is a real problem in India. At the 61st month (or 5 years), only half (48%) of life policies are still in force, which means more than half of policyholders quit within 5 years.
  • Surrender value calculations were also a hard-to-understand black box. In effect, they helped pay for high agent commissions rather than being fair to the customer.
  • The major culprit here in the mis-selling arena has been the banks. They already have the customer base and the trust, and they misused both to push unnecessary and unsuitable high-commission products. On some traditional products, banks earned as much as 70% of the first-year premium. The conflict of interest was obvious. The incentive to cheat the customer or to meet sales targets pushed down from the bosses was so high that, in many cases, customers (including those vulnerable ones like those aged 70+) were lied to in the face. I have long maintained that you should use banks only for simple banking services and nothing else. Never take financial advice from your bank.
  • IRDAI proposes product-level commission caps that sit well below current market practice. The upper limits are lower for institutional distributors (Insurance Distribution Entities, or IDEs, such as banks and brokers) than for individual agents. Pure term insurance is also treated differently from savings-cum-insurance products. This is good, because the regulator is finally trying to stop the industry from pushing the wrong product on a trusting customer.
  • One of the most interesting things in this reform is that if a policy is mis-sold, the name of the agent or bank RM can be put in the public domain. If implemented, this could be a game-changer for the consumer. Today, the RM or agent knows that not much will happen if they mis-sell a policy. Under the new proposal, the risk is a lasting negative record, and we all know how brutal the internet is. Once a seller is tagged as a mis-seller, their life and future employment can become difficult. The rules will need a fair process, with a way to appeal and records that expire, so that nobody is named wrongly. But done right, I think this is a far stronger deterrent to mis-selling than anything else in the proposal.
  • One thing I feel strongly about: life insurance and health insurance are two very different things, and the proposal should treat them differently. Unlike life insurance, health insurance needs careful servicing and handholding when customers are in distress. A sharp cut in health commissions may improve the risk pool, but it also risks lowering the service levels that health cover depends on. This needs a relook.

The regulator IRDAI has finally shown guts and acted as a strong regulator must. My worry is not its intent, which is right. My worry is the lobby of banks, NBFCs and agents, which is well organised and will do everything to protect itself.

Policyholders have been mis-sold and cheated for far too long. I hope that, just this time, the regulator remembers that its first job is to protect the insurance customer. And I hope a major part of this proposal eventually gets implemented.

Reference:

  1. Recalibrating Economics of Insurance Distribution Proposal – Part 1 and Part 2

1 comment

  1. A very insightful perspective on how insurance commission structures can influence customer trust and lead to mis-selling. Greater transparency, fair distribution practices, and customer-focused regulations are essential for building a more reliable insurance ecosystem. At Helios Global Solutions, we believe accountability and ethical business practices are key to long-term growth.

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